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Abstract
This paper studies robust transmit design for secure AF relay networks with imperfect channel state information (CSI).
Two CSI error models, deterministically bounded error model and stochastic error model, are considered. In order to
use the power at relays more efficiently, a joint cooperative relaying and jamming scheme is considered, where relays
cooperate to forward the source signal and simultaneously they cooperate to send jamming signals to confuse the
eavesdroppers. In this joint cooperative relaying and jamming framework, we address the robust joint optimization of
the relay weights and the input covariance matrix of jamming signals for secrecy rate maximization (SRM), under both
total and individual relay power constraints. Specifically, for the case of deterministically bounded error model, where
the CSI error can be specified by an uncertainty set, we maximize the worst-case secrecy rate. While for the case of
stochastic error model, where the probability distribution of the CSI error is Gaussian, we maximize the outage
constrained secrecy rate. The challenge of these considered SRM-based optimizations lies in their non-convexity. This
paper shows that such SRM-based optimization can be solved in a convex fashion and via solving a sequence of
semidefinite programs (SDPs). Numerical results are presented to show the efficacy of the proposed scheme.
Keywords: Physical-layer security, Amplify-and-forward relay, Cooperative communications, Imperfect channel state
information
1 Introduction
In the classical three-node wiretap channel, secrecy
capacity is typically zero when the source-destination link
is weaker than the source-eavesdropper link [1, 2]. One
way to achieve non-zero secrecy rate in this case is to
introduce multi-antenna nodes [3–11], wherein multi-
antenna techniques can enable directional transmission,
thus allowing secret communication even when the eaves-
dropper’s channel has a much better quality. However,
due to the cost or size limitations, multi-antenna nodes
may not be available in some practical applications. In
this case, node cooperation is an alternative way to enable
single-antenna nodes to enjoy the benefits brought by
multi-antenna nodes [12–23].
Generally, there are two kinds of cooperation schemes.
One is cooperative relaying [14–16], where relays coop-
erate to improve the source destination channel quality.
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The other is cooperative jamming (CJ) [13–15], where
relays cooperate to send jamming signals to confuse the
eavesdroppers.
In [13–16], cooperative relaying and cooperative jam-
ming were considered independently. In contrast, the
works of [18–26] considered a joint cooperative relaying
and jamming scheme, where some of the relays cooper-
ate to forward the source signal and simultaneously the
other relays cooperate to send jamming signals to confuse
the eavesdroppers. Such joint scheme is especially use-
ful when the number of relays is large. Later, in [27, 28],
a more general joint cooperative relaying and jamming
scheme was proposed, where each relay forwards the
source signal and transmits jamming signals simultane-
ously. Due to noise amplification at relays, there exists a
rate performance ceiling for the source-relay-destination
(SRD) link, thus spending extra power in relaying will
not help increase the secrecy rate after a certain point
is reached. In contrast, distributing a portion of power
to transmit jamming signals to confuse the eavesdropper
may be more helpful.
© 2016 Li et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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Most of the works mentioned above assume the avail-
ability of a perfect channel state information (CSI) at
relays. In practice, the CSI available at relays is usu-
ally imperfect due to different factors such as estimation
error, quantization, and feedback delay. In addition, the
rate performance of the relay designs obtained under
the assumption of perfect CSI degrades in the pres-
ence of CSI errors. Hence, it is important to develop
relay designs that are robust to CSI errors. Works along
these lines include [29–35] which consider the scenario
with no relays and [24–27] which consider the scenario
with relays. As compared with the transmission design
in the former scenario, the robust secure relay design
is more difficult due to noise amplification at relays.
Moreover, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, exist-
ing robust designs for secure AF relay networks are few.
For example, the works [24, 25] considered the stochastic
CSI error model which is applicable when the imperfect
CSI is mainly due to errors in channel estimation and
tried to minimize the outage probability of the secrecy
rate. The works [26, 27] considered the deterministically
bounded CSI error model which is applicable when the
CSI error is dominated by quantization errors and tried
to compute the maximal achievable worst-case secrecy
rate.
In this paper, we aim to give a more general frame-
work which applies to both the deterministically bounded
CSI error model and the stochastic CSI error model. For
the case of deterministically bounded error model, we
maximize the worst-case secrecy rate. While for the case
of stochastic error model, we maximize the outage con-
strained secrecy rate. As in our conference paper [27],
we consider a more general joint cooperative relaying and
jamming scheme, where each relay forwards the source
signal and transmits jamming signals simultaneously. We
should note that the works [24–26] considered a differ-
ent joint cooperative relaying and jamming scheme, where
some of the relays cooperate to forward the source signal
while the other relays cooperate to send jamming signals
to confuse the eavesdroppers.
Our main contributions are summarized below.
1. Robust joint optimization of the relay weights and
the input covariance matrix of jamming signals for
secrecy rate maximization (SRM) is addressed, under
both total and individual relay power constraints.
The challenge of these SRM-based optimizations lies
in their non-convexity. In this paper, we provide a
unified approach for solving these SRM-based
optimizations. The key insight is to recast the
SRM-based problem as a two-level optimization
problem: an outer problem and an inner problem.
We show that the outer problem can be dealt with a
one-dimensional search, while the inner problem
admits a tight convex relaxation and hence can be
exactly solved in an efficient manner.
2. The crux of our approach is to construct a tight
convex relaxation of the inner problem. To deal with
this issue, we first introduce an alternative secrecy
rate constrained (SRC) power minimization problem,
i.e., minimizing the total relay power, under
constraints on the achievable worst-case secrecy rate
or the achievable outage constrained secrecy rate.
We solve the SRC power minimization problem with
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) techniques, and we
prove that the relaxation here is tight. We then prove
that the optimal relay weights and input covariance
matrix of jamming signals in the SRC power
minimization problem also constitute an optimal
solution to our inner problem. In this way, we provide
a tight convex relaxation of our inner problem.
We should note that in the practical implementation of
any coherent wireless communication systems, the issue
of synchronization needs to be addressed. In this paper,
the relay transmissions are assumed to be synchronized,
by resorting to global positioning system (GPS) satellite
signals [36] or the master-slave scheme [37]. Imperfect
synchronization can also be overcome by employing car-
rier frequency offset (CFO) compensation [38]. Since
our goal is to give the fundamental limit of the secrecy
transmission rate from a theoretic perspective, and also
due to the lack of space, in this paper, we do not go
into the detailed analysis of the impact of imperfect
synchronization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the system model. In Section 3, we consider
the deterministically bounded CSI error model and com-
pute the maximal achievable worst-case secrecy rate. In
Section 4, we consider the stochastic CSI error model
and compute the maximal achievable outage constrained
secrecy rate. Numerical results are provided in Section 5,
and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Notation. AH , tr{A}, and rank{A} represent the hermi-
tian transpose, trace, and rank of a matrix A, respec-
tively; diag{A} denotes a diagonal matrix with the same
main diagonal elements as the matrix A; [A]k,k denotes
the kth diagonal element of the matrix A; diag{a} rep-
resents a diagonal matrix with a on the main diagonal.
I is an identity matrix with appropriate size; A  0
means A is a hermitian positive semidefinite matrix;
A ∈ Hn means A is a n × n complex hermitian matrix.
x ∼ CN (0,) means x is a random variable fol-
lowing a complex circular Gaussian distribution with
mean zero and covariance ; E{·} is the expectation
operator. CN×M represents a N × M complex matrix
set.
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2 Systemmodel
As depicted in Fig. 1, a source node aims to send con-
fidential messages to the destination in the presence of
M eavesdroppers, with the help of N relays. Each node
is equipped with one antenna. Two phases including the
broadcasting phase and the relaying phase are required. In
the broadcasting phase, the source broadcasts its message
and the received signal at relays is given by
yR = hSRs + nR, (1)
where s, E{|s|2} = Ps, is the data to be transmitted. hSR ∈
C
N×1 represents the channel vector from the source to
the relay. nR is the noise vector at relays, with i.i.d. entries
distributed as CN (0, σ 2R). In the relaying phase, the relay
forwards a weighted version of the received signal. Simul-
taneously, the relay transmits jamming signals, nJ, to con-
fuse the eavesdropper. The signal transmitted by relays
can thus be expressed as
x = diag{v}(hSRs + nR) + nJ, (2)
where v is the relaying weight vector.
Denote hHRD ∈ C1×N and gHRE,m ∈ C1×N as the chan-
nel vector from the relays to the destination and the mth
eavesdropper, respectively. The signals received at the des-
tination and the mth eavesdropper can be respectively
expressed as
yD = hHRDdiag{v}(hSRs + nR) + hHRDnJ + nD, (3)
yE,m = gHRE,mdiag{v}(hSRs+ nR) + gHRE,mnJ + nE,m, (4)
where nD ∼ CN (0, σ 2D) and nE,m ∼ CN (0, σ 2E ) are the
AWGN at each receiver.
Denote h = diag{hSR}hRD and gm = diag{hSR}gRE,m the
channel from the source to the destination and the mth
eavesdropper, respectively. For a given relaying weight
vector v and input covariance matrix of jamming signals
QJ , the received signal-to-noise (SNR) at the destination
and themth eavesdropper are, respectively,
γD = Psh
HQvh





σ 2E + gHRE,m(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} + QJ )gRE,m
, (6)
where Qv = vvH . The transmitted power of the kth relay,
k = 1, · · · ,N , is tk(Qv,QJ ) = ζk(Qv,QJ ), where
ζk(A,B) 
[
Psdiag{hSRhHSR}A+ σ 2RA+ B
]
k,k .
In this paper, we aim to address the robust joint opti-
mization of the relay weights and the input covariance
Fig. 1 AF relay network with single-antenna nodes
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matrix of jamming signals for SRM, under both total and
individual relay power constraints. Two CSI error mod-
els, the deterministically bounded error model and the
stochastic error model, are considered. For the case of
deterministically bounded error model, we aim to max-
imize the worst-case secrecy rate. While for the case of
stochastic error model, we aim to maximize the outage
constrained secrecy rate. The challenge of these SRM-
based optimizations lies in their non-convexity. In the
following sections, we provide a unified approach for
solving these SRM-based optimizations.
3 Robust joint relaying and jamming design with
norm-bounded CSI error
In this section, we study the case where the CSI of the
eavesdropping channel is partially known. The determin-
istically bounded error model is considered, and we aim
to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate. To this end, we
first solve the SRC power minimization problem.We then
study the relationship between the solutions of the SRC
power minimization problem and the worst-case SRM
problem. By exploiting this relationship, we provide an
approach for solving the worst-case SRM in a convex
fashion.
3.1 Channel uncertainty
The channel vector from the relays to the eavesdroppers
are modeled as [30]
gRE,m = gˆRE,m+gRE,m,m = 1, . . . ,M, (7)
where gˆRE,m is the channel information known at the
source node. We should note that the estimation of the
eavesdropper’s channel is possible in situations in which
the eavesdropper is an active member of the network,
and thus, its whereabouts and behavior can be monitored.
gRE,m denotes the channel uncertainties. The deter-
ministically bounded error model is considered in this
section.
Thus, the actual channel coefficients gRE,m is contained
in a certain sphere, i.e.,
m = {gRE,m|‖gRE,m − gˆRE,m‖F ≤ βm}, (8)
where βm is a known constant.
3.2 Worst-case secrecy rate constrained power
minimization
In this subsection, we consider the SRC power mini-
mization problem, i.e., minimizing the total relay power,





s.t. γD ≥ δ1,
γE,m ≤ δ2,∀gRE,m ∈ m,m = 1, · · · ,M,
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N ,
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (9)
where δ1 and δ2 denote the SNR constraints on the legiti-
mate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.







σ 2D + hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} +QJ )hRD
≥ δ1
PsgHmQvgm
σ 2E + gHRE,m(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} + QJ )gRE,m
≤ δ2
∀gRE,m ∈ m, m = 1, · · · ,M
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Qv  0,QJ  0. (10)
Proposition 1. The optimization (10) can be reformu-
lated into a SDP and solved by CVX.
Proof. To handle the imperfect-CSI induced constraints
in (10), we need the following lemma (please see [39] for
more details).
Lemma 1. Let ϕk(x) = xHAkx + 2	{bHk x} + ck, where
Ak ∈ Hn, bk ∈ Cn×1, ck ∈ R. Assume that there exists a
point xˆ such that ϕ1(xˆ) < 0. Then, the implication ϕ1(x) ≤











For ease of exposition, we first rewrite the second con-
straint in (10) as
gHRE,mgRE,m − δ2σ 2E ≤ 0 (11)
where  = Psdiag{hSR}HQvdiag{hSR} − σ 2Rδ2diag{Qv} −
δ2QJ . Substituting (7) into (11) yields
gHRE,mgRE,m + 2	{gˆHRE,mgRE,m}
+gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m − δ2σ 2E ≤ 0. (12)
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According to Lemma 1, ‖gRE,m‖2F ≤ β2m ⇒(12) if and
only if for some μm ≥ 0,
[
μmI− −H gˆRE,m
−gˆHRE,m −β2mμm − gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m + δ2σ 2E
]
 0.




s.t. Pstr{hhHQv} ≥ δ1σ 2D + δ1ξ¯ (Qv,QJ )[
μmI− −H gˆRE,m
−gˆHRE,m −β2mμm − gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m + δ2σ 2E
]
 0
m = 1, · · · ,M
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N
μm ≥ 0,Qv  0,QJ  0, (13)
where we define ξ¯ (Qv,QJ ) = tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Qv +
hRDhHRDQJ }.
According to [39], the optimization (13) is a SDP and
can be solved by CVX. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2. Denote the optimal solution to (10) as
{Qˆv, QˆJ }. Then, Qˆv is rank 1, provided that a positive
secrecy rate is achieved.
Proof. See Appendix A.
By applying the matrix decomposition, we get Qˆv =
vˆvˆH . From Proposition 2, the rank 1 constraint relaxation
in (10) is tight. Therefore, {vˆ, QˆJ } is the optimal solution
to (9).
3.3 Worst-case secrecy rate maximization
In this subsection, we aim to maximize the worst-case
achievable secrecy rate subject to both total and individual






2 log(1 + γD) −
1
2 log(1 + γE,m)
s.t.
∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (14)
In general, the optimization problem in (14) is non-
convex and challenging to solve directly. To deal with this
issue, the two-layer idea in [13] is adopted. The key insight
is to recast the original optimization problem in (14) as
a two-level optimization problem. The inner-level part is
dealt with the SDR technique, and the outer-level part




1 + f¯ (τ )
1 + τ , (15)
where f¯ (τ ) is obtained through solving the following
inner-level part optimization problem for a given τ
f¯ (τ ) = max{v,QJ }
PshHQvh




σ 2E + gHRE,m(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} + QJ )gRE,m
≤ τ
∀gRE,m ∈ m, m = 1, · · · ,M∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (16)
By dropping the rank 1 constraint onQv, we reformulate
the optimization (16) as
g¯(τ ) = max{Qv,QJ }
PshHQvh




σ 2E + gHRE,m(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} + QJ )gRE,m
≤ τ
∀gRE,m ∈ m, m = 1, · · · ,M∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Qv  0,QJ  0. (17)
Proposition 3. The optimization (17) can be reformu-
lated into a SDP and solved by CVX.
Proof. By letting η = 1
σ 2D+hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv}+QJ )hRD
, Q˜v =
ηQv, Q˜J = ηQJ , and using the Charnes-Cooper transfor-
mation, we recast the optimization (17) as
g¯(τ ) = max
{Q˜v,Q˜J ,η}
Pstr{hhHQ˜v}
s.t. σ 2Dη + tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Q˜v + hRDhHRDQ˜J } = 1
PsgHmQ˜vgm
σ 2Eη + gHRE,m(σ 2Rdiag{Q˜v} + Q˜J )gRE,m
≤ τ
∀gRE,m ∈ m, m = 1, · · · ,M∑N
k=1 ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPr
ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Q˜v  0, Q˜J  0, η > 0. (18)
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Applying the same derivation from (11) to (12) and
applying Lemma 1, we re-express the optimization (18) as
g¯(τ ) = max{Qv,QJ ,η,μ1,··· ,μM}Pstr{hh
HQ˜v}
s.t. σ 2Dη + tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Q˜v + hRDhHRDQ˜J } = 1[
μmI−  −H gˆRE,m
−gˆHRE,m −β2mμm − gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m + τησ 2E
]
 0
m = 1, · · · ,M∑N
k=1 ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPr
ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPk , k = 1, · · · ,N
Q˜v  0, Q˜J  0, η > 0,μm ≥ 0, (19)
where  = Psdiag{hSR}HQ˜vdiag{hSR} − σ 2Rτdiag{Q˜v} −
τ Q˜J .
According to [39], the optimization (19) is a SDP and
can be efficiently solved by CVX. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 4. Go back to the optimization problem
(10), and let δ1 = g¯(τ ), δ2 = τ . Then, the optimal solution
to (10), {Qˆv, QˆJ }, constitutes an optimal solution to (17).
Proof. Denote by {Q¯v, Q¯J } the optimal solution to (17).
Because {Q¯v, Q¯J } is feasible to the optimization (17), it is
also feasible to (10). In addition, {Qˆv, QˆJ } is the optimal
solution to (10), thus
∑N
k=1 ζ(Qˆv, QˆJ ) ≤
∑N
k=1 ζ(Q¯v, Q¯J ) ≤ Pr ,
which indicates the point {Qˆv, QˆJ } is feasible to the opti-
mization (17).
For notional simplicity, let
(Qv,QJ ) = Psh
HQvh
σ 2D + hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} +QJ )hRD
.
From the definition of g¯(τ ), (Qˆv, QˆJ ) ≤ g¯(τ ). More-
over, from (10), (Qˆv, QˆJ ) ≥ g¯(τ ), Thus, we have
(Qˆv, QˆJ ) = g¯(τ ),
which implies that the point {Qˆv, QˆJ } achieves the max-
imal value of the optimization (17). This completes the
proof.
Remark. According to Proposition 4, {Qˆv, QˆJ } consti-
tutes an optimal solution to (17). In addition, according to
Proposition 2, rank{Qˆv} = 1, thus, the optimization (17)
is indeed a tight approximation of (16). Besides, {vˆ, QˆJ } is
the optimal solution to (16) and f¯ (τ ) = g¯(τ ).
So far, the inner-level part is solved and f¯ (τ ) is deter-
mined for any given τ . The remaining issue now is to
resolve the optimal τ  maximizing the objective func-
tion in (15). In (15), τlb and τub denote the lower and
upper bound of γE,m, respectively. Firstly, γE,m is no less
than 0, thus, we set τlb = 0. Secondly, according to the
security requirement, γE,m should be no more than γD.
Thus, we set τub = PsPr|h|2/σ 2D. By performing one-
dimensional search over [ τlb, τub], the optimal τ  which
maximizes the objective function in (15) could be found.
Correspondingly, the optimal solution {v,QJ } to the orig-
inal optimization (14) can be obtained. In Table 1, we
summarize our proposed algorithm for maximizing the
worst-case secrecy rate.
4 Robust joint relaying and jamming design with
stochastic CSI error
In this section, we extend our joint cooperative relay-
ing and jamming scheme in Section 3 to the stochastic
CSI error model case, and we maximize the outage con-
strained secrecy rate. In particular, we first solve the
SRC power minimization problem. We then study the
relationship between the solutions of the SRC powermini-
mization problem and the outage constrained secrecy rate
maximization problem. By exploiting this relationship, we
provide an approach for solving the outage constrained
secrecy rate maximization problem in a convex fashion.
4.1 Channel uncertainty
The channel vector from the relays to the eavesdroppers
are modeled as [35]
gRE,m = gˆRE,m + gRE,m,m = 1, . . . ,M, (20)
where g¯RE,m denotes the presume part at source node and
gRE,m is the error channel vectors. We assume that each
Table 1 An algorithm for determining the optimal solution
{v ,QJ } which maximizes the worst-case secrecy rate
1. Initialize τlb = 0, τub = PsPr |h|2/σ 2D , Ps > 0, Pr > 0, Pk ≥ 0, τ = 0,
τsz > 0 where the step size τsz is an arbitrarily small positive quantity;
2.while τ ∈ [ τlb , τub] do
3. Calculate g¯(τ ) by solving (17) and let f¯ (τ ) = g¯(τ );
4. Let τ = τ + τsz ;
5. end while
6. Determine τ  which maximizes the objective function of (15);
7. Let τ = τ  and calculate g¯(τ ) by solving (17);
8. Calculate {Qˆv , QˆJ} by solving (10);
8. Do the matrix decomposition Qˆv = vˆvˆH ;
9. The optimal solution v = vˆ, QJ = QˆJ .
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channel error vector has a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian distribution
gRE,m ∼ CN (gˆRE,m,Cm) m = 1, . . . ,M. (21)
4.2 Secrecy outage constrained power minimization
In this subsection, we consider the secrecy outage con-
strained power minimization problem, i.e., minimizing
the total relay power, under the constraint on the achiev-




s.t. γD ≥ δ1
Prob{γE,m ≤ δ2} ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (22)
By letting ξ¯ (Qv,QJ ) = tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Qv +





s.t. Pstr{hhHQv} ≥ δ1σ 2D + δ1ξ¯ (Qv,QJ )
Prob{γE,m ≤ δ2} ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv  0,QJ  0, (23)
which is not known to be computationally tractable due to
its rate outage probability constraints.
Proposition 5. The optimization (23) can be safely
approximated with a SDP.
Proof. Our strategy for tackling the rate outage con-
straints is to find a convex set to approximate them.
To this end, we first rewrite the rate outage probability
constraints as
Prob{−gHRE,mgRE,m + δ2σ 2E ≥ 0} ≥ 1 − ρ, (24)
with  = Psdiag{hSR}HQvdiag{hSR} − σ 2E δ2diag{Qv} −
δ2QJ . Combining (20) with (21), we arrive at
gRE,m = gˆRE,m + C1/2m em, (25)
where em ∼ CN (0, IN ).
Substituting (25) into (24), we then arrive at
Prob{eHmQmem + 2	{eHmr} + cm ≥ 0} ≥ 1 − ρ, (26)
in which Qm = −C1/2m C1/2m , rm = −C1/2m gˆRE,m, and
cm = δ2σ 2E − gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m.
Applying the Sphere Bounding method in [40], we
obtain a convex restriction of (26) as follows:
[
μmI+Qm rm
rHm cm − μmd2
]
 0,∀m, (27)




(1 − ρ)/2 is the ball radius and
−1
χ2m
(.) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of
the (central) chi-square random variable with m degrees
of freedom.
By replacing the rate outage probability constraints in




s.t. Pstr{hhHQv} ≥ δ1σ 2D + δ1ξ¯ (Qv,QJ )[
μmI+ Qm rm
rHm cm − μmd2
]
 0,∀m
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
μm ≥ 0,Qv  0,QJ  0. (28)
According to [39], the optimization (28) is a SDP and
can be solved by CVX. This completes the proof.
Proposition 6. Denote the optimal solution to (23) as
{Qˆv, QˆJ }. Then Qˆv is rank 1, provided that a positive
secrecy rate is achieved.
Proof. The KKT conditions of (28) are the same as





Following the proof in Appendix A, it is easy to verify
rank(Qˆv) = 1. This completes the proof.
By applying the matrix decomposition, we get Qˆv =
vˆvˆH . From Proposition 5, the rank 1 constraint relaxation
in (23) is tight. Therefore, {vˆ, QˆJ } is the optimal solution
to (22).
4.3 Outage constrained secrecy rate maximization
In this subsection, we aim to maximize the achievable
outage constrained secrecy rate, subject to both total and
individual relay power constraints, i.e.,
max{r,v,QJ }
r
s.t. Prob{Rd − Re,m ≥ r} ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0, (29)
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where Rd = 12 log(1+ γD), Re,m = 12 log(1+ γE,m). Letting
re = Rd − r, we reformulate (29) as
max{re,v,QJ }
Rd − re
s.t. Prob{Re,m ≤ re} ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (30)
By applying the two-layer idea in [13], we recast (30) as











where f¯ (τ ) is obtained through solving the following
inner-level part optimization problem for a given τ ,
f¯ (τ ) =max{v,QJ }
PshHQvh
σ 2D + hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} +QJ )hRD
s.t. Prob{γE,m ≤ τ } ≥ 1 − ρ, ∀m∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv = vvH ,QJ  0. (32)
By dropping the rank 1 constraint onQv, we obtain
g¯(τ ) = max{Qv,QJ }
PshHQvh
σ 2D + hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv} +QJ )hRD
s.t. Prob{γE,m ≤ τ } ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m∑N
k=1 ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pr
ζk(Qv,QJ ) ≤ Pk ,∀k
Qv  0,QJ  0. (33)
Proposition 7. The optimization (33) can be safely
approximated with a SDP.
Proof. By letting η = 1
σ 2D+hHRD(σ 2Rdiag{Qv}+QJ )hRD
, Q˜v =
ηQv, Q˜J = ηQJ , and using the Charnes-Cooper transfor-
mation, we recast the optimization (33) as
g¯(τ ) = max
{Q˜v,Q˜J ,η}
Pstr{hhHQ˜v}
s.t. σ 2Dη + tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Q˜v + hRDhHRDQ˜J } = 1
Prob{−gHRE,mgRE,m + τησ 2E ≥ 0} ≥ 1 − ρ,∀m∑N
k=1 ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPr
ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPk ,∀k
Q˜v  0, Q˜J  0, η > 0, (34)
where  = Psdiag{hSR}HQ˜vdiag{hSR} − σ 2Rτdiag{Q˜v} −
τ Q˜J .
Applying the same derivation from (26) to (28), we safely
approximate the rate outage constraint with LMIs, and
reformulate the optimization (34) as
g¯(τ ) = max
{Q˜v,Q˜J ,η,μ1,··· ,μm}
Pstr{hhHQ˜v}
s.t. σ 2Dη + tr{σ 2Rdiag{hRDhHRD}Q˜v + hRDhHRDQ˜J } = 1[
μmI− C1/2m C1/2m −C1/2m gˆRE,m




k=1 ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPr
ζk(Q˜v, Q˜J ) ≤ ηPk ,∀k
Q˜v  0, Q˜J  0, η > 0,μm ≥ 0, (35)
where cm = τησ 2E − gˆHRE,mgˆRE,m. According to [39], the
optimization (35) is a SDP and can be solved by CVX. This
completes the proof.
Proposition 8. Go back to the optimization problem
(23), and let δ1 = g¯(τ ), δ2 = τ . Then, the optimal solution
to (23), {Qˆv, QˆJ }, constitutes an optimal solution to (33).
Proof. The proof is similar with that of Proposition 4 and
thus omitted here. This completes the proof.
Remark. We should note that rank{Qˆv} = 1 according
to Proposition 6. Thus, the solution, {Qˆv, QˆJ }, is indeed a
tight approximation of (32). Moreover, f¯ (τ ) = g¯(τ ).
So far, the inner-level part is solved and f¯ (τ ) is deter-
mined for any given τ . The remaining issue now is to
resolve the optimal τ  maximizing the objective func-
tion in (31). In (31), τlb and τub denote the lower and
upper bounds of γE,m, respectively. Firstly, γE,m is no less
than 0, thus we set τlb = 0. Secondly, according to the
security requirement, γE,m should be no more than γD.
Thus, we set τub = PsPr|h|2/σ 2D. By performing a one-
dimensional search over [ τlb, τub], the optimal τ  which
maximizes the objective function in (31) could be found.
Correspondingly, the optimal solution {v,QJ } to the orig-
inal optimization (29) can be obtained. In Table 2, we
summarize our proposed algorithm for maximizing the
outage constrained secrecy rate.
5 Numerical results
In this section, we present the numerical results to validate
the secrecy rate performance of the proposed joint coop-
erative relaying and jamming scheme. The transmit power
at the source node Ps = 10 dB. The covariance of noise at
receivers σ 2D = σ 2E = σ 2R = 1. The number of relays N =
10. The individual relay power budget Pk = 0.5Pr/N for
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Table 2 An algorithm for determining the optimal solution
{v ,QJ } which maximizes the outage constrained secrecy rate
1. Initialize τlb = 0, τub = PsPr |h|2/σ 2D , Ps > 0, Pr > 0, Pk ≥ 0, τ = 0,
τsz > 0 where the step size τsz is an arbitrarily small positive quantity;
2.while τ ∈ [ τlb , τub] do
3. Calculate g¯(τ ) by solving (33) and let f¯ (τ ) = g¯(τ );
4. Let τ = τ + τsz ;
5. end while
6. Determine τ  which maximizes the objective function of (31);
7. Let τ = τ  and calculate g¯(τ ) by solving (33);
8. Calculate {Qˆv , QˆJ} by solving (23);
8. Do the matrix decomposition Qˆv = vˆvˆH ;
9. The optimal solution v = vˆ, QJ = QˆJ .
k = 1, · · · ,N/2, and Pk = 2Pr/N for k = N/2+ 1, · · · ,N .
For ease of exposition, ∀m, we set βm/
√
N = ε for the
case of deterministically bounded CSI error model and set
Cm = εI for the case of stochastic CSI error model. At
each trial, the entries of the channels hSR and hRD, gˆRE,i are
randomly generated following an independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and unit variance. Results are averaged
over 1000 independent channel trials.
In the following figures, the lines labeled as “SRD link
without Eaves” show the maximal achievable rate of the
no-eavesdropper case, which provides an upper bound on
the secrecy rate of all security schemes. The lines labeled
as “Proposed CR and CJ” and “Relaying without jamming”
illustrate the worst-case or the outage constrained secrecy
rate achieved by the proposed joint cooperative relaying
and jamming scheme (also referred to as the proposed
scheme in the sequel) and the relaying without jamming
scheme, respectively. We should note that for the relaying
without jamming scheme, we set QJ = 0 and compute
the relaying weights v according to Tables 1 and 2. The
lines labeled as “Jamming Power” denote the power ratio
allocated to jamming signals, i.e.,
δ = tr{QJ }/(tr{Qv} + tr{QJ }).
The maximal achievable secrecy rate results versus the
total relay power budget are plotted in Fig. 2. Here, we set
the number of eavesdroppersM = 2 and assume that CSI
is perfectly known. That is, let ε = 0 or let C = 0 and
compute the optimal input parameter {v,QJ } according
to Table 1 or Table 2. It can be observed that there exists a
rate performance ceiling on the SRD link. This is because
the signal received at relays contains both the signal
transmitted from the source and the unavoidable additive
noise. Amplifying the received signal will also amplify the
additive noise. We should note that the gap between the
maximal secrecy rate that can be achieved by any security
schemes and the maximal achievable rate of the SRD link
is caused by the secrecy constraint. Obviously, the pro-
posed scheme gets a smaller gap than the relaying without
jamming scheme. Moreover, when the power budget at
relays is large enough, the secrecy rate achieved by the
proposed scheme approaches the maximal achievable rate
of the SRD link.
The worst-case secrecy rate results of different schemes
versus the number of eavesdroppers are plotted in Fig. 3.
Here, the total relay power budget Pr = 20 dB and the
channel mismatch ε = 0.2. It can be observed that both
the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme and that
achieved by the relaying without jamming scheme decline
with the increasing number of eavesdroppers. However,
the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme always
outperforms that achieved by the relaying without jam-
ming scheme. Moreover, the secrecy rate achieved by the
proposed scheme declines gently while that achieved by
the relaying without jamming scheme decreases dramati-
cally. When the number of eavesdropper becomes larger,
the power allocated to jamming signals becomes larger,
and the benefits of using cooperative jamming is more
obvious.
The channel mismatch impact on the worst-case
secrecy rate of different schemes is plotted in Fig. 4. Here,
the total relay power budget Pr = 20 dB and the num-
ber of eavesdroppers M = 2. It can be observed that
both the worst-case secrecy rate achieved by the pro-
posed scheme and that achieved by the relaying without
jamming scheme decline with the increasing of channel
uncertainties. However, the robustness of the proposed
scheme is more obvious. In particular, the worst-case
secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme always
outperforms that achieved by the relaying without jam-
ming scheme. Moreover, the worst-case secrecy rate
achieved by the proposed scheme declines gently, while
that achieved by the relaying without jamming scheme
decreases dramatically. The power allocated to jamming
signals increases as the channel mismatch becomes larger.
The number of eavesdroppers impact or the channel
mismatch impact on the achievable outage constrained
secrecy rate are plotted in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
We set the secrecy rate outage probability ρ = 0.1, the
total relay power budget Pr = 20 dB. In Fig. 5, we set
the channel mismatch Cm = 0.02I and let the number
of eavesdroppers vary from 1 to 6. In Fig. 6, we set the
number of eavesdroppersM = 2 and let the channel mis-
match vary from 0 to 0.2. Similar to the behavior in Figs. 3
and 4, both the outage constrained secrecy rate achieved
by the proposed scheme and that achieved by the relay-
ing without jamming scheme decline with the increasing
number of eavesdroppers or the channel uncertainties.
However, the outage constrained secrecy rate achieved by
the proposed scheme declines gently, while that achieved
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Fig. 2 Secrecy rate and transmit power fraction versus total relay power budget
Fig. 3Worst-case secrecy rate and transmit power fraction versus the number of eavesdroppers when ε = 0.2
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Fig. 4Worst-case secrecy rate and transmit power fraction versus channel mismatch
Fig. 5 Outage constrained secrecy rate and transmit power fraction versus the number of eavesdroppers
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Fig. 6 Outage constrained secrecy rate and transmit power fraction versus channel mismatch
by the relaying without jamming scheme decreases dra-
matically. The outage constrained secrecy rate achieved by
the proposed scheme always outperforms that achieved by
the relaying without jamming scheme. Besides, the power
ratio allocated to the jamming signals increases as the
number of eavesdroppers increases or the channel mis-
match becomes larger. Based on these observations, we
verify the robustness of the proposed joint cooperative
relaying and jamming scheme.
6 Conclusions
This paper addressed robust joint optimization of the
relay weights and the input covariance matrix of jam-
ming signals for secrecy rate maximization (SRM), under
both total and individual relay power constraints. Two
CSI error models, deterministically bounded error model
and stochastic error model, were considered. For the
case of deterministically bounded error model, we max-
imized the worst-case secrecy rate. While for the case
of stochastic error model, we maximized the outage
constrained secrecy rate. The challenge of these SRM-
based optimizations lies in their non-convexity. In this
paper, we provided a unified approach for solving these
SRM-based optimizations. Specifically, we recast the orig-
inal non-convex optimization problem into a sequence
of convex optimization problems, via two-level reformu-
lation and semidefinite relaxation techniques. Numer-
ical results showed that the secrecy rate achieved by
the proposed joint cooperative relaying and jamming
scheme outperforms that achieved by the relaying with-
out jamming scheme. Especially, when the CSI is per-
fectly known and the power is large enough, the secrecy
rate achieved by the proposed scheme approaches that
achieved by the SRD link. Moreover, with the increasing
of the total relay power budget, the number of eavesdrop-
pers, or the channel uncertainties, distributing part of the
total relay power to transmit jamming signals becomes
more necessary in order to improve the secrecy rate
performance.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: Denote the optimal solution to (10) as
{Qˆv, QˆJ }. Then Qˆv is rank-one, provided that a positive
secrecy rate is achieved.
Proof. According to Section III, solving the optimiza-
tion (10) equals to solving the optimization (13) which is
convex with part of the KKT conditions as follows
Y = Psdiag{hSRhHSR} + σ 2RI
















SR} + σ 2REk], (36a)







k=1 vkEk , (36b)
YQˆv = 0, (36c)
Y  0,X  0,Bm  0,∀m, vk ≥ 0,∀k, λ ≥ 0, (36d)
in which Gm =
[I, gˆRE,m]. Y and X are dual variables
associated with Qˆv and QˆJ , respectively. In addition, λ, Bm
and vk are dual variables associated with corresponding
inequalities in (13).
Combining (36a) and (36b), we arrive at the following
equality

























Y = Y˜ − λPshhH . (37)
Generally, diag{hSRhHSR}  0. And the other two terms in
the sum expression of Y˜ are non-negative hermite matri-
ces. On the other hand, from (36d), X  0, so diag{xd} 
0. Therefore, we arrive at Y˜  0.
According to [41], we have rank{λPshhHQˆv} ≤ 1. Sub-
stituting (37) into (36c), we arrive at Y˜Qˆv = λPshhHQˆv.
Thus, rank{Y˜Qˆv} = rank{λPshhHQˆv} ≤ 1. In addition,
Y˜  0, so rank{Qˆv} = rank{Y˜Qˆv} ≤ 1. On the other hand,
rank{Qˆv} = 0 implies Qˆv = 0 which contradicts with the
positive secrecy rate requirement. Thus, rank{Qˆv} = 1.
The completes the proof.
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